The function of words a language in the thought-reality relationship of some Indian philosophical schools

Abstract

One of the strongest prejudices when approaching or teaching something of Indian philosophical issues has been that their thought is exclusively religious, mystical or lacking abstract, formal, structured and logical reasoning. Naturally, once this approach is made, we can realize from the beginning that nothing is further from reality. For this reason, the propose
of this text is to show how, based on certain theoretical elements of some philosophical schools in India —mainly the pramāṇa (प्रमाण) or means of valid knowledge—, it is possible to establish a dialogue based on a common problem: the meaning and the role of language in the relationship between thought and reality. It will also be explained, in a brief and general way, how it is possible to place these positions in two large groups: philosophies with realistic tendencies, such as nyāya or sāṁkhya; and anti-realist philosophies —not necessarily idealistic for that reason— such as madhyamaka Buddhism. It is also shown that these tendencies can be proven, if not determined, by the type of inferences and the style and form of the argumentation used there: affirmative (tarka [तर्क]/vāda [वाद]), or negative (vitaṇḍā [वितण्डा]). Thus, it is marked the difference between conceptions closer to referential or pragmatic
conceptions of language, respectively.